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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Coast Guard has deployed several hundred port patrol vessels to protect 
U.S. Navy ships and other high-value assets in ports world-wide.  Each vessel has an 
armed crew of four, is relatively fast, and features a simple surface search radar, radios, 
and a machine gun.  These vessels coordinate surveillance patrols in groups of two or 
four, perhaps working with shore-based radar.  We seek to advantageously position these 
vessels, and perhaps shore-based radar too, to minimize the probability that an intelligent 
adversary in one or more speed-boats will evade detection while mounting an attack.  
Attackers can use elevated obstructions to our radar detection in their attack paths, and 
ports feature many such restrictions to navigation and observation.  We make a key, but 
realistic assumption that complicates planning:  we assume the attackers will see or be 
told of our defensive positions and capabilities in advance of mounting their attack.  We 
demonstrate our defender-attacker optimization with a fictitious port, and with Los 
Angeles-Long Beach, Hong Kong, U.S. Navy 5-th Fleet in Bahrain, and the Al Basra oil 
terminal.  In cases we analyze, we can almost certainly detect any attack, even though the 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
We introduce a new planning tool for locating shore radar stations and mobile 
picket boats with radar to maximize the probability that one or more speedboat attackers 
will be discovered before reaching any of a set of defended assets, such as pier-side U.S. 
Navy ships or other high-value maritime assets at risk. The distinguishing contribution 
here is that our planning tool explicitly recognizes that the attackers can be expected to 
have prior knowledge of our defensive disposition, either through shore observers, 
satellite imagery, or on-board radar threat detectors: we assume the attackers will observe 
our defensive preparations, and respond accordingly. There is no other such decision 
support tool available today for maritime domain awareness. 
Our motivation derives from the “Maritime Domain Awareness Concept” 
published by the Chief of Naval Operations on May 29, 2007, declaring the U.S. Navy’s 
understanding and commitment to National Security Presidential Directive 41 “Maritime 
Security Policy,” published on December 21, 2004. Maritime domain awareness is a 
worldwide problem, with shared responsibilities among allied governments and private 
enterprise.  
We demonstrate how to position SAFE Defender Class picket ships optimally to 
protect high-value defended assets.  We can also locate and fuse shore-based radar 
returns with those from our boats. We use standard radar equations for our detection 
predictions, but can accommodate any alternate means of assessing the probability of 
detection. Our model also represents any restriction to navigation, such as shoreline, 
islands, and breakwaters, with planner-specified fidelity; these obstructions may also 
obstruct our radars, so we use ray tracing to gauge whether or not an attacker can be 





While detecting and alarming attacks is our primary goal, having a picket 
platform intercept a detected attack may or may not be possible, due to the relative speeds 
of the defending pickets and the attacker craft. In our scenario we use the SAFE Defender 
class boat which operates at a maximum speed of 46 knots. Speed matters, and an 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. What is the Problem? 
Maritime port security is a newly-sharpened focus for the United States (U.S.) 
Congress, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the U.S. Navy (USN). The 
U.S. deems maritime security a “vital national interest” (DHS, 2005, p. 1). Current 
maritime threats vary from the possible hijacking of a commercial vessel to ramming an 
explosive-packed small boat into a ship similar to the 2000 attack on the USS Cole 
(Carafano, 2007, p. 2).  
Maritime ports are “sprawling, easily accessible by water and land, close to 
crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven with complex transportation networks” 
(DHS, 2005, p. 9). Such ports are highly susceptible to enemies seeking multiple “high 
impact” objectives to attack. The Al-Qaida terrorist organization has demonstrated the 
desire and capability of carrying out such an attack (MI5, 2007).  
A major maritime threat is exemplified by the Sea Tigers, a maritime detachment 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE, a rebel organization in Sri 
Lanka, has fought for its independence since 1976. They demonstrate very sophisticated 
tactics in attacking Sri Lankan Naval and commercial ships (Murphy, 2006). Their first 
suicide boat attack was in 1990. In 1994, they managed to sink a Sri Lankan Navy 
warship. Their methods range from utilizing multiple boats (see Figures 1 and 2) 
simultaneously to the employment of distracting fire from shore to mount a coordinated 
attack. They continue to pose a significant threat and have carried out attacks as recently 
as May 2006 (Murphy, 2006). 
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Figure 1.   Archival snapshot of a high-speed boat in a training video captured from 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (From: Murphy, 2006). 
 
Figure 2.   Archival snapshot of a high-speed boat in a training video captured from 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (From: Murphy, 2006). 
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We anticipate a determined adversary who plans to infiltrate a maritime port for 
an attack. We seek a systematic way to assign defensive pickets to detect and alarm such 
an attack, even though such defensive preparations will be visible to the attacker. Optimal 
placement of sensor platforms reduces the probability of a successful attack. For our 
purposes, a first, single successful enemy infiltration is the signal event we wish to alarm. 
Subsequent to such a first event, interdicted or not, we assume that defenses would 
qualitatively change. 
B. MOTIVATION 
1. Why is the Problem Important? 
 
Figure 3.   USS Cole after the deadly 2001 attack in Port of Yemen killing 17 Sailors 
(From: Murphy, 2006). 
The world economy is dependent on maritime commerce, which accounts for 
approximately 80% of the world trade (DHS, 2005, p. 1). Today there are 30 mega-ports 
worldwide, which almost all cargo ships pass through in the intricate trade network 
(Caldwell, 2007, p. 1). A disruption in any one of these mega-ports, even for a short time, 
could have a devastating impact on the flow of goods and oil throughout the world.  
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress enacted two major 
bills specifically addressing maritime security. The Maritime Transportation Security Act 
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(MTSA) took effect in November 2002. It requires ports to develop security plans and to 
identify risk areas (Caldwell, 2007, p. 1). The Security and Accountability for Every Port 
Act (SAFE Port Act), passed in October 2006, is a MTSA amendment, addressing some 
security issues not previously covered. It also includes provisions that incorporate 
international ports as part of the overall security plan, recognizing that maritime security 
is not a one-nation concern, but rather part of a complex intertwined global network 
(Caldwell, p. 2). 
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41 establishes policy and 
guidelines for all U.S. agencies and stakeholders in maritime security. At the same time it 
defines Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as the “effective understanding of anything 
associated with global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, 
or environment of the United States” (NSPD-41, 2004). Consequently, in May, the MDA 
Concept was published by the Chief of Naval Operations. The United States Navy (USN) 
reinforces NSPD-41 by declaring MDA is a world-wide problem, with shared 
responsibilities among allied governments and private enterprise. The MDA Concept also 
recognizes that simply adding more sensors and defensive assets does not suffice 
(NMDAC, 2007). 
The economic impact of a single attack on one mega-port leading to degradation 
of throughput or even a complete port closure could be dire. For example, the ports of 
Los Angeles and Long Beach account for approximately 40% of all cargo container 
traffic entering the U.S. (The Caltrade Report, 2007). The longshoremen strike of 2002 
lasted for just ten days, but has been estimated to have cost to the U.S. economy 
approximately $2 billion a day (Isidore, 2002).  
Agencies responsible for maritime security include the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. 
Navy. DHS has funded a combined total of $3.8 billion for these activities from FY 2006 
to FY 2008 alone (DHS, 2007, p. 19). Considerable investments are being made to 
develop new technologies to aid maritime security. These range from the Protector 
Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV) (JFS, 2008) to the Raytheon-developed Athena 
system that integrates existing sensors to provide decision makers with real-time 
 5
situational awareness (Weisman, 2005). USCG has also acquired approximately 700 
SAFE Defender Class boats in order to fulfill the maritime security requirement 
mandated by the SAFE port act (Jane’s, 2005). The USN has reestablished its riverine 
forces and equipped them with SAFE Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC). 
2. How Will the Problem be Solved without Our Involvement? 
The burden of overall port security falls on the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG, 2005). 
The Coast Guard has established Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) involving 
all the different agencies and authorities at each port, and has created local operation 
centers to improve information sharing and coordination of assets (Caldwell, 2007, p. 5). 
At the same time, the U.S. Navy has expanded its operational focus from blue water to 
littoral waters as well. They are tasked with establishing ties with international allies to 
enhance MDA (NMDAC, 2008, p. 2).  
The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) [2005] stipulates a layered 
security combining the capabilities of the different stakeholders of each port (DHS 2005, 
p. 20). This layered defense affords decision makers multiple points from which to react 
to any potential threat and perhaps serve as deterrence to any enemy. The physical 
protection of a port from land and sea is still the foundation, and divides a port into 
different enforcement zones and vessel movement control areas (DHS, 2005, p. 21).  
The U.S. Coast Guard has employed a three-tiered Maritime Security (MARSEC) 
alert level that mimics the Homeland Security Advisory System (DHS, 2002) with Level 
1 being the lowest and Level 3 the highest. The MARSEC addresses all aspects of 
maritime threats from ports to critical infrastructure located near sovereign waters. The 
Coast Guard sets preplanned responses for each level (USCG, 2007, p. 1). 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard employed Port Security Units 
(PSU) comprised of mostly reserve personnel. They were not assigned to specific ports 
but could deploy within 24 hours and become fully-operational within 96 hours with a 
self-sustained capability of 30 days. Each unit had small boats that are easily deployable 
(USCG, 2004, p. 1). 
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Post 9/11 Port Security Units comprise the bulk of the USCG maritime defense 
teams. They operate in two postures depending on the threat level and manning: either 
with four boats on duty allowing two boats to be on station at all times, or with six boats 
on duty and four boats always on station. The two other boats not on station act as a 
standby or shuttle boat and a 24-hour maintenance boat (USCG, 2004, p. 4). Patrol times 
can vary from four to six hours. Disposition of boats is left to the judgment to the Tactical 
Action Officer (TAO) who is delegated by the Commanding Officer (CO) (USCG, 2004, 
p. 3). Employment and tactics depend heavily on the CO and TAO personal experience. 
In accordance with the MTSA of 2002, Maritime Safety and Security Teams 
(MSST) have been created by the Coast Guard to fill the security gaps at major U.S. 
ports. The MSST are rapidly-deployable teams comprised of 75 active duty personnel 
trained in advanced tactical boat operations, anti-terrorism, and force protection. 
Currently, there are 14 teams based in some of the major U.S. ports (USCG, 2005).  
Current security measures include patrol vessels, radars, container scanners, and 
patrol cars and trucks. Activities include land and water security patrols, boarding of 
suspected vessels and enforcement of fixed security zones. The intensity of the activities 
varies in accordance with MARSEC level (Caldwell, 2007, p. 11). Command and control 
of these operations are conducted from 35 sector inter-agency command centers covering 
the entire United States. These centers facilitate the gathering and dissemination of 
information to all agencies involved for a given port region. Twenty-four of these sectors 
need to upgrade their facilities at a cost of $260 million in order to meet the SAFE Port 
Act requirements, including new sensor networks that enable faster information sharing 
(Caldwell, 2007, p. 10).   
The defense of ports has improved greatly in the past six years. However, 
disposition of assets is planned on a perceived threat basis. A lot of emphasis is placed on 
thwarting an attack through presence (i.e., assuming the potential attacker can observe 
our defensive preparations and may be dissuaded). 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We will introduce a bi-level optimization model to position our radars and then 
predict how an intelligent attacker would respond, given these defensive positions are 
visible.  This employs a bilevel mixed-integer linear program (MIP) to express a 
defender-attacker optimization. 
Bard and Moore [1990] introduce techniques to solve a bilevel mixed integer 
linear programming problem. They develop an algorithm that can solve this bilevel MIP 
heuristically.  
Wood [1993] develops a network interdiction model for an enemy who wants to 
maximize flow through a capacitated network; whereas a defender attempts to interdict 
this network and minimize flow with a limited number of defensive assets visible to the 
enemy. The model is applied to anti-drug smuggling operations where the main focus is 
the intercept of chemicals used in drug production.  
Isreali and Wood [2002] describe a shortest-path network interdiction problem 
and formulate it using a bilevel MIP. They introduce efficient decomposition techniques 
to solve such a problem.  
Brown et al. [2006] develop bilevel and trilevel optimization models for the 
defense of critical infrastructure.  They apply these models to many real-world examples 
in order to highlight any vulnerabilities in such infrastructures.  They show the benefits of 
such models in aiding decision makers make appropriate defensive plans.  
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II. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
We anticipate a determined intelligent attacker using speed boats to try to reach 
fixed high-value targets in the maritime domain. We are most interested in a port where, 
for instance, U.S. Navy ships might be anchored or pier-side. The attacker can employ 
several methods of attack, either ramming an explosive ridden boat into the target or 
getting close enough to employ weapons such as a rocket propelled grenade (RPG). The 
attacker’s motivation is to cause maximum effect. That could entail serious damage to 
shipping or infrastructure, or merely as a psychological form of terrorism. Either way we 
consider a single successful initial undetected attack as a failure of the defender. We 
assume transparency in our model in that the enemy can view our defensive 
prepositioning and react accordingly to avoid detection. 
The attacker utilizes a number of small speedboats similar to a 20 foot Baja 
Outlaw Class (Table 1). The defender employs SAFE Defender class patrol (see Table 2) 
boats along with shore radar instillations in order to detect the attacker.  
 
Baja 20’ Outlaw Class 
Length 20'4" - 6.2 m 
Beam 7'10" - 2.39 m 
Weight 2,900 lb - 1,315 kg 
Weight w/ explosives 3,900 lb 
Draft 34" - 86.36 cm 
Fuel Capacity 50 gal - 170.3 L 
Passenger Capacity 6 
Max speed 54.2 knots 
Attack Range w/RPG 200m 
Table 1.   20’ Baja Class Specifications (From: Baja Marine, 2008). 
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SAFE Defender Class 
Length 25’ - 7.62 m 
Beam 8’6” - 2.59 m 
Draft 3’ – 0.91 m 
Fuel Capacity 50 gal - 170.3 L 
Crew 4 
Max Capacity 10 
Max speed 46 knots 
Radar Furuno 4 kW radar 
Range (36 NM) 
Armament Effective Range 
One 12.7 mm machine gun 1500 m 
Capabilities Detect & Intercept 
Table 2.   SAFE Defender Class Patrol Boats (From: SAFE, 2003). 
A. NETWORK REPRESENTATION 
Because we are in the maritime domain, where there are no strict paths or routes, 
we represent our maritime environment using an mesh network. We break down the 
surface into square cells of a given width and generate a node in the middle of each. Each 
cell is connected by an arc to and from every adjacent node (horizontal, vertical, or 
diagonal) unless we specify an obstruction to navigation (see Figures 4 and 5). The 
attacker can traverse any arc between adjacent nodes to reach a goal cell. Each defender 
platform is assigned a cell (node) to occupy, from which he will surveil as much maritime 
domain as possible.  
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Figure 4.   Sample network representation with square cells of constant width, each 
identified by a row and a column index. An attacker can traverse from any 
cell via an arc to any adjacent cell. 
 
Figure 5.   Sample network representation with cells and obstructions. Blackened 
cells are obstructions to navigation, as well as observation. Cells (i02, j02) 
and (i03, j03) are not adjacent. For instance, a defender in the North-West 
cell (i01, j01) cannot detect an attacker in the South-East cell (i05, j05) nor 
any of the grey cells (if any portion of a cell is obscured by an 
intermediate obstruction, we conservatively assume the entire cell is 
obscured).  
B. PROBABILITY OF EVADING DETECTION 
Equations (P1) through (P9) introduce our radar equations used to estimate the 
probability that a defender in one cell can detect an attacker in another one. The relative 
locations of defender and attacker are shown in (P1) and (P2). A defender in some given 
position may not be able to detect an attacker in some other position due to intervening 
obstructions. The following assumes positions with no such obstruction. To achieve the 
resolution we require we assign cell_width  = 0.15 NM (P3). The maximum speed of a 
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Defender class boat is 46 nautical miles per hour (knots) and the cruise speed is 35 knots. 
Therefore, we assign v  = 35 (P4). Each SAFE Defender boat is equipped with a Furuno 4 
kW radar with a maximum range of 36 NM, therefore we assign mr = 36 (P5). For our 
sweep rate in (P8) we assign sr = 0.8 (P6). The range between defender and attacker is 
expressed by (P7). The defender pays a penalty when travelling faster in the form of a 
decreased detection probability. The detection probability (P8) goes to zero once the 
distance between attacker and defender is greater then the maximum radar range. 
We assume the intelligent attacker will want to maximize his probability of 
evasion by traversing a path with the maximum joint probability of evading detection 
while transiting each cell. In (P9), we compute this evasion probability. Assuming cell-
to-cell independence, the joint probability that a path will evade detection is the product 
of the evasion probabilities of each cell traversed. We take the logarithm of this 
expression to render a linear summation of log likelihoods, and note that maximizing the 
sum of these logs is equivalent to maximizing the product of the probabilities. Our simple 
radar equation can be replaced by one with much higher fidelity, [e.g., Skolnik, 1990], 
but for purposes of our exposition this makes no difference at all.  
  
( ) ( )2 2
2 2
( , ) attacker cell (P1)
( , ) defender cell (P2)
cellsidedistance (P3)
defender velocity (P4)
maximum radar range (P5)





























⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Table 3.   Derivation of evasion probability by an attacker located at cell ( , )a ai j from a 
defender at cell ( , )d di j , assuming no intervening obstruction to observation. 
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C. RAY TRACING 
We use ray tracing to determine if an obstacle between a searcher and an attacker 
obscures the attacker.  We assume a ray from searcher p to target a intersects some 
intermediate obstacle x. 
pxr  distance from searcher p to obstacle x [meters]  
xar  distance from obstacle x to attacker a [meters] 
ph  height above surface of searcher p [meters] 
xh  height above surface of obstacle x 
ah  height above surface of attacker a 







⎛ ⎞− +> + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
. 
In spherical geometry, we need to define: 
,px xar r  great-circle distances [meters] 
R radius of Earth [ 66.371x10≅ meters] 
/px pxr Rθ =  [radians] 
/xa xar Rθ = [radians] 
palos  straight line of sight from searcher p to attacker a [meters] 
2 2( ) ( ) 2( )( )cos( )pa p a p a px xalos R h R h R h R h θ θ= + + + − + + +  




θ θ− ⎛ ⎞+= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
( )pxD Cπ θ= − +  
sin( )( )
sin( )x p
Ch R h R
D
> + − . 
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D. MODEL FORMULATION 
1. The Attacker 
The attacker has a set of speedboats a A∈  that can each choose to enter a 
network at any of a number of entry cells c E∈ , traverse a set of cell-to-cell arcs d D∈  
to reach and exit the network at any of a number of goal cells c G∈  where defended 
assets are located.  Each arc admits a limited number of speed boat traversals arc_cap.  
Traversing each arc carries a risk of detection the attacker cannot control, and the log 
likelihood that an attacker will evade detection while traversing arc d is n devX .  The 
attacker seeks attack paths that maximize the log likelihood of evading detection.   
We express the attackers’ planning problem with the model nAMAX(evX) . 
Indexes and index sets [~cardinality] 
a A∈   attacker [~5] 
ijc C∈   cells with horizontal, vertical coordinates (alias c1, c2) [~1,000] 
c E C∈ ⊆  cells where an attacker can enter the network [~100] 
c G C∈ ⊆  goal cells with defended assets [~10] 
1, 2c cd D D∈ =  cell adjacencies, or traversal arcs [~8,000] 
Data [units] 
_arc cap  maximum attackers traversing any arc [attackers] 
n
devX   log of probability that an attacker will evade detection traversing arc d  
  [log likelihood] 
Variables [units] 
cENTER  number of attackers entering network at entry cell c [attackers] 
dY   number of attackers traversing arc d [attackers] 
cGOAL  number of attackers exiting network at goal cell c [attackers] 
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Formulation [dual variables] 
n n ( )max
, 2 1,
( ) max A0
. . | | [ ] (A1)
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≤ ∀ ∈







The attackers’ objective (A0) is to maximize the total expected log likelihood that 
attackers traversing arcs from entry cells on paths to goal cells will evade detection (or, 
equivalently, to maximize the joint probability that they evade detection over all the arcs 
they choose to traverse).  Constraint (A1) limits the number of entries into the network 
via entry cells, each constraint (A2) forces conservation of flow at a cell in the network, 
and constraint (A3) limit the number of exits from the network via goal cells.  
Stipulations (A4-6) give bounds on the decision variables.  If the data in (A1), (A3), and 
(A5) is integral, this linear program will produce an intrinsically integral solution Y*. 
2. The Defender 
The defender controls a set of surveillance platforms (e.g., patrol boats, shore 
radar installations, etc.) p P∈  that may each be located at a set of cells pc S∈  to surveil 
arcs in the network.  The log likelihood that an attacker traversing arc d will evade 
detection by defender boat p located in cell c is , ,d p cev .  The defender seeks positions for 
his surveillance platforms to collectively minimize the total log likelihood of attackers 
evading his surveillance.  We express the defender’s problem as follows ˆDMIN(Y) . 
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New indices and index sets [~cardinality] 
p P∈   defending platforms [~5] 
pc S C∈ ⊆  cells where a platform p can be located [~250] 
New data [units] 
, ,d p cev   log likelihood that an attacker traversing arc d would evade detection by  
  defender p in position c [log likelihood] 
dˆY    number of attackers traversing arc d [attackers] 
Variables [units] 
,p cX   =1 if platform p located in cell c, 0 otherwise [binary] 
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(D0) introduces the objective, and constraint (D1) defines the objective variable as the 
minimum upper bound on total log likelihood of evasion.  Each constraint (D2) requires a 
defender platform to be located in just one cell, each constraint (D3) allows any cell to be 
occupied by at most one defender, and (D4) stipulates a binary location decision for each 
defender. 
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3. Defender-Attacker Model 
We now consider a realistic case, and a worrisome one.  The defender wishes to 
optimize defensive pre-positioning of surveillance platforms while assuming the attacker 
will observe these preparations and optimize attacks to exploit any weakness in these 
defenses.  The defender’s objective is to minimize the maximum probability of evasion 
by attackers.  We note that this model is a conservative one for the defender because he 
must protect against the worst possible set of attacks.  Moreover, it is conservative for the 
attacker because he must plan against the best possible defense. 
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We cannot solve MINMAX with conventional techniques, but if we temporarily 
fix variables Z and X, the result is a capacitated network flow linear program.  Taking the 
dual of this linear program, and freeing Z and X, we achieve an integer linear program 
SAFE-ILP we can solve with conventional techniques. 
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This reformulation uses the variables introduced as duals for the constraints in AMAX. 
The “defender-attacker” two-sided option solves SAFE_ILP to position seen defender 
platforms, recovering the corresponding attack plans by solving nAMAX(evX)  with 
variables X fixed at their optimal values, and n , , , , ,d p c d p c p cev X=evX . 
4. Decomposition 
SAFE_ILP can be (very) hard to solve at large scale.  Accordingly, we have 
decomposed the SAFE optimization as follows.  We modify ˆDMIN(Y) , replacing 
equation (D1) with a set of constraints (D1D). 
New index 
k K∈   decomposition iteration 
New Data 
kˆY   attacker plans for iteration k 









d p c d p c
d D
p P c S p
Z Y Z
s t Z ev Y X
∈∈ ∈
=
≥ ∑ ,     k=1,…, K    (D1D) 
and constraints (D2)-(D4). 
The complete decomposition algorithm is as follows: 
Algorithm MINMAX 
Input: Data for defense problem, optimality tolerance 0ε ≥ ; 
Output: ε-optimal SAFE location plan *X , and responding attacker plan 
*Y ; 
1. Initialize best upper bound UBZ ←∞ , best lower bound 
LBZ ←−∞ , define the incumbent, null SAFE plan * 1ˆ← ←X X 0  
as the best found so far, and set iteration counter K ← 1; 
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2. Subproblem: Using n , , , , ,d p c d p c p cev X=evX , solve subproblem 
nAMAX(evX) ) to determine the optimal attack plan ˆ KY  given 
ˆ KX ; the bound on the associated objective is max ˆ( )KZ X ; 
3. If ( max ˆ( )KUBZ Z> X  ) set max ˆ( )KUBZ Z← X  and record improved 
incumbent SAFE plan * ˆ K←X X , and responding attacker plan 
* ˆ K←Y Y ; 
4. If ( UB LBZ Z ε− ≤ ) go to End; 
5. Master Problem:  Given attack plans ˆ kY , k=1,…K, attempt to 
solve master problem ˆDMIN(Y)  to determine an optimal defender 
plan 1ˆ K+X .  The bound on the objective is min ˆ( )Z Y ; 
6. If  min ˆ( )LBZ Z< Y  set min ˆ( )LBZ Z← Y ; 
7. If  ( UB LBZ Z ε− ≤ ) go to End; 
8. Set K ← K +1 and go to step (2) (Subproblem); 
9. End:  Print “ *X  is an ε-optimal SAFE solution, and *Y  is the 
attacker response to that plan,” and halt. 
For the sake of efficiency, one need not store incumbent attacker plans *Y  in step 3.  
These can be recovered after-the-fact by computing  n *, , , , ,d p c d p c p cev X=evX  and solving 
nAMAX(evX) . 
The advantage here is that the decomposition isolates a large subproblem that is a 
capacitated maximum-flow linear program from the much smaller, and simpler integer 
linear program master problem to locate platforms.  The former problem can be solved 
very quickly with a specialized network simplex algorithm (e.g., Bradley, et al. 1977), 
and the latter can be solved with a local search heuristic.  This offers the opportunity to 
write a customized solver in a programming language without need for licensed 
mathematical modeling language or commercial optimization solver, thus reducing the 




We produce several instances that include a generic situation for sensitivity tests 
as well as several real-world ports and maritime assets. Our real-world examples include 
the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach, Port of Hong Kong, USN Fifth Fleet 
headquarters in Bahrain, and Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) in Iraq. The first two are 
considered mega-ports both of which are an integral part of the international commerce 
network. An attack on either one could critically disrupt international trade causing 
massive delays and ultimately losses of millions of dollars. Bahrain holds strategic 
importance for the United States. The Fifth Fleet includes all naval assets from the Suez 
Canal to the Indian Ocean. ABOT is considered the lifeline of the Iraqi economy. It 
currently accounts for 97% of the Iraqi crude oil exports to the world (United States 
Embassy – Iraq, 2006). As the only major source of funding to the Iraqi government, any 
disruption of operations will hinder rebuilding operations and will be another factor of 
instability in that country.  
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We demonstrate planning methods with our sample of defense surveillance 
problems using different numbers of defenders and numbers of attackers. Each SAFE 
Defender class boat normally operates within ten nautical miles of its home base location 
(USCG, 2004, p. 4ff). 
For each defense planning problem, we evaluate a combination of one-to-four 
attacker boats versus two and four defender boats. We include obstruction masking of 
defender radars, with ray tracing to determine exactly which cells can be seen by a 
defender boat in any particular picket position. The obstruction masking ray tracing is 
very computationally expensive in our mathematical modeling language, but trivial, and 
fast, in a procedural programming language.  We have programmed the ray tracing and 
obstruction geometry separately from the model generation language, thus achieving two 
orders of magnitude speed-up of computation (e.g., ray tracing for a single scenario has 
been reduced from almost two hours to less than a minute). The obstruction masking 
elicits real-world terrorist behavior to hide and evade detection. 
Our model achieves nearly 100% probability of detection for every surveillance 
problem. 
We are dealing with small, fast attack boats, and we want a high-resolution 
maneuver network. We assign cell width to be 0.15 NM. The surveillance problems we 
state fit within a 30 vertical by 35 horizontal cell matrix. The marine domains are about 
4.5 NM by 5.3 NM, or a total surveillance area of about 24 NM2.  
The GAMS modeling language and CPLEX solver (GAMS, 2008) respectively 
generate a problem instance in about a two hours (with almost all of this time spend ray 
tracing for cell-to-cell radar visibility), and a few minutes in CPLEX. Exporting the ray 
tracing reduces the GAMS execution time to less than a minute. 
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CPLEX cannot solve some instances, issuing obscure diagnostics that turn out to 
be due to insufficient random access computer memory. For example, our Los Angeles-
Long Beach DUAL-ILP has (6,799 rows, 3,862 columns, and 18,210,510 nonzero 
elements), overflowing two gigabytes of memory.  
We have employed the Benders Decomposition.  Each Benders decomposition 
subproblem has only 838 rows, 6,016 continuous variables, and 12,032 nonzero 
elements; and each master problem 761 rows, 3,025 binary variables, and 9,073 non-zero 
elements. The decomposition converges to zero decomposition gap in 13 iterations (just a 
few seconds of compute time).  
A. GENERIC SURVEILLANCE PLANNING PROBLEM 
In our generic instance we pose a maritime environment where there are islands 
and obstacles between the attacker and the goal target cells. Table 4 shows the suggested 
positions of each of two defender platforms, and Table 5 for four defenders. We solve 
these instances using decomposition and achieve, at once, a decomposition gap of 0% 
and approximately 100% probability of detection for each instance.  
 




One Attacker i01 j27 i27 j01 
Two Attackers i01 j27 i27 j01 
Three Attackers i30 j09 i02 j25 
Four Attackers i30 j09 i02 j25 
Table 4.   Generic instance positioning two defender boats against one-to-four attacker 










Figure 6.   Generic instance with a single attacker and two SAFE Defender boats. The 
defended goal cells “G” are (i01,j1) and (i01,j02). The SAFE defender 
boats are based at cells “H” (i02,j01) and (i03,j01). Obstacle boundaries 
are shown with “[#]”.  The attacker can enter via any cell on the threat axis 
labeled “E” (the southeast border). Defender boats cannot locate too close 
to goal cells, or their alarm would be of little use, and “.” indicates just 
how close (or where else) they can locate. Here, the defenders are located 
at (i27,j01) and (i01,j26). The lone attacker enters at (i30,j26), and, 
knowing defender positions, uses obstacles as best able to maximize 
probability of evasion, then plans a nearly-direct run at goal cell (i01,j02). 













Figure 7.   Generic instance with two attackers and two SAFE Defender boats. As 
with just one attacker, the defenders still position at (i27,j01) and 
(i01,j26), and the two attackers spread out to use obstructions to influence 
and weaken defender sensing. Recall, our defender positioning is in 
anticipation of a raid of two, and the two attackers know where we are 
pre-positioned. Note how the defender positions maximize the coverage of 












Figure 8.   Generic instance with three attackers and two SAFE Defender boats. 
Defenders position at (i30,j08) and (i02,j24), the better to observe three 
independent attackers. Compare with the one- and two-attacker cases, and 
you see the defenders adapt to the attackers’ increased degrees of freedom 
to use obstructions. The defenders are positioned to thwart the worst-case 













Figure 9.   Generic instance with four attackers and two SAFE Defender boats. 
Optimal defender positions are the same picket locations as for the three-
attacker case.  
 
 Defender 1 Defender 2 Defender 3 Defender 4 
One Attacker i30 j06 i30 j09 i05 j22 i01 j27 
Two Attackers i27 j01 i30 j09 i05 j22 i01 j27 
Three Attackers i21 j08 i30 j21 i24 j08 i01 j27 
Four Attackers i28 j17 i30 j21 i22 j07 i02 j25 










Figure 10.   Generic instance with a single attacker and four SAFE Defender boats. 
Optimal defender locations are (i30,j5), (i30,j8), (i05,j21) and (i01,j26). 
Once you see this defensive plan, you can intuit why it dominates all 
others, given the attacker can see it too. However, without optimal advice 
such as this, you may not have discovered a plan nearly as effective at 














Figure 11.   Generic instance with two attackers and four SAFE Defender boats. 
Optimal defender locations are (i27,j01), (i30,j09), (i05,j22) and (i01,j27). 
The defenders positions remains the same as the one-attacker case with 















Figure 12.   Generic instance with three attackers and four SAFE Defender boats. 
Optimal defender locations are (i30,j03), (i30,j09), (i02,j25) and (i01,j27). 
With the increase of attackers to three, we see the defenders one and three 


















Figure 13.   Generic instance with four attackers and four SAFE Defender boats. 
Optimal defender locations are (i29,j10), (i30,j09), (i05,j22) and (i02,j25). 
In this case we see all the defenders reposition themselves with the 
exception of Defender 2, who remains in the same position for all cases. 
Defenders 1 and 3 exhibit the most drastic repositioning to achieve 
optimal detection. Again, their actions prove not to be intuitive at all.  
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B. PORT OF LOS ANGLES 
 
Figure 14.   Satellite image of Port of Los Angeles (From: Google Earth). 
For the Port of Los Angeles, we demonstrate our model using decomposition with 
either two defenders or four defenders. Subsequently, we try each combination against a 
single attacker and up to four. We can achieve an optimal probability of detection of 1.0 
with all combinations. Optimal placement of the defenders is shown in Table 6 against a 
single attacker and up to four. Figures 15 through 18 illustrate the position of the 
defender boats for each scenario along with the responding optimal attacker paths. We 
observe that when the number of attackers increases to more then two, optimal boat 
positioning drastically changes from a close grouping inside the breakwater to one boat 









One Attacker i18 j08 i25 j08 
Two Attackers i19 j08 i24 j08 
Three Attackers i21 j08 i30 j19 
Four Attackers i23 j08 i30 j20 
Table 6.   Port of Los Angeles — Two Defender boats optimal positioning against one 
to four attacker boats. 
 
Figure 15.   Port of Los Angeles instance with a single attacker and two SAFE 
Defender boats. The defended goal cells are (i08,j05) and (i08,j6). The 
SAFE defender boats are based at cells “H” (i06,j02) and (i07,j02). 
Obstacle boundaries are shown with “[#]”, and land-mass with “[X]”. The 
attacker can enter via any cell on the threat axis labeled “E” at the 
southeast border. Defender boats cannot locate too close to goal cells, or 
their alarm would be of little use, and “.” indicates where defender boats 
can be located here, no closer than 1 NM to any goal cell. In this instance, 
the defenders are located at (i25,j08) and (i18,j08). The single attacker 
enters at (i27,j35), and while knowing defender preparations still decides 
to directly attack the goal cell (i08,j05). The attacker probability of 






Figure 16.   Port of Los Angles instance with two attackers and two SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal defender locations are cells (i19,j08) and (i24,j08). The 
















Figure 17.   Port of Los Angeles instance with three attackers and two SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal defender locations are cells (i21,j08) and (i30,j19). With 
the increase of the attacker from two to three, defender 1 slightly moves 
two cells south (0.3 NM) while defender 2 is repositioned dramatically to 
the mouth of the breakwater at cell (i30,j19).  
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Figure 18.   Port of Los Angeles instance with four attackers and two SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal defender locations are cells (i23,j08) and (i30,j20). The 
defender boats only slightly reposition from the case of three attackers to 
maintain a probability of evasion by the enemy at nearly zero. 
When running the Los Angeles instance with four defenders, optimal positioning 
is slightly different with respect to the number of attackers. Table 7 lists the optimal 
positions of the four defender boats against the one-to-four attackers. Against one 
attacker, the defender assignments are all within the breakwater of the port. As the 
number of attackers increases to two and three, one defender is positioned at the entrance 
of the port while the others remain inside (see Figures 20 and 21). With four attackers, we 









 Defender 1 Defender 2 Defender 3 Defender 4 
One Attacker i17 j08 i18 j08 i19 j08 i25 j08 
Two Attackers i22 j07 i23 j08 i24 j08 i29 j22 
Three Attackers i21 j08 i24 j07 i24 j08 i30 j21 
Four Attackers i22 j07 i23 j08 i28 j17 i30 j21 
Table 7.   Port of Los Angles instance – positioning four defender boats against one-to-
four attacker boats that attack with prior knowledge of defender positioning. 
 
Figure 19.   Port of Los Angeles instance with one attacker and four SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal defender locations are cells (i17,j08), (i18,j08), (i19,j08), 
and (i25,j08). The defenders are positioned in a straight line, with defender 









Figure 20.   Port of Los Angeles instance with two attackers and four SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal defender locations are cells (i22,j07), (i23,j08), (i24,j08), 
and (i29,j22). An increase of only one attacker invokes a remarkable 
change in defensive positioning. The first three defenders break their line, 
but nonetheless maintain a tight grouping, and the fourth defender is 

















Figure 21.   Port of Los Angeles instance with three attackers and four SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal defender locations are cells (i21,j08), (i24,j07), (i24,j08), 




















Figure 22.   Port of Los Angeles instance with four attackers and four SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal defender locations are cells (i22,j07), (i23,j08), (i28,j17), 
and (i30,j21). We observe that as the attackers increase to four, two boats 
are positioned at the mouth of the breakwater and two remain within the 
confines of the port’s waters. 
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C. PORT OF HONG KONG 
 
Figure 23.   Satellite image of the port of Hong Kong (From: Google Earth). 
The port of Hong Kong is one of the busiest in the world and traffic density 
presents a challenge to defenders.  Allowing threat entry cells from the east and west, we 
invoke an unexpected optimal defender positioning.  We demonstrate planning using 











One Attacker i17 j05 i18 j05 
Two Attackers i25 j05 i26 j05 
Three Attackers i25 j05 i26 j05 
Four Attackers i25 j05 i26 j05 
Table 8.   Port of Hong Kong  – positioning two Defender boats against one-to-four 
attacker boats that attack with prior knowledge of defender positioning. 
 
Figure 24.   Port of Hong Kong instance with a single attacker and two SAFE 
Defender boats. The defended goal cells are (i08,j20) and (i09,j20). The 
SAFE defender boats are based at cells “H” (i18,j27) and (i18,j28). 
Obstacle boundaries are shown with “[#]”, and land-mass with “[X]”. The 
attacker can enter via any cell on the threat axis labeled “E”. Defender 
boats cannot locate too close to goal cells, or their alarm would be of little 
use, and “.” indicates possible defender boats can be locations. The two 
defenders are positioned in cells (i17,j05) and (i18,j05) which forces the 
single attacker to enter at cell (i09,j01) to attack the goal cells. However, 
probability of evasion is reduced to near zero. 
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Figure 25.   Port of Hong Kong instance with two attackers and two SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal positioning of defenders are in cells (i25,j05) and (i26,j05). 
The two defenders shift down eight cells (1.2 NM) as the attackers 
increase from one to two. One optimal attacker enters from the north-west, 
and the other from the south-east. 
  Defender 1 Defender 2 Defender 3 Defender 4 
One attacker i18 j04 i17 j05 i18 j05 i19 j05 
Two attackers i26 j04 i25 j05 i26 j05 i26 j05 
Three attackers i26 j04 i25 j05 i26 j05 i26 j05 
Four attackers i26 j04 i25 j05 i26 j05 i26 j05 
Table 9.   Port of Hong Kong instance – positioning four defender boats against one-to-










Figure 26.   Port of Hong Kong instance with a single attacker and four SAFE 
Defender boats. Optimal positioning of defenders are in cells (i18,j04), 
(i17,j05), (i18,j05), and (i19,j05). The defenders maintain a tight grouping 
even as the number of defenders is increased to four. 
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Figure 27.   Port of Hong Kong instance with two attackers and four SAFE Defender 
boats. Optimal positioning of defenders are in cells (i26,j04), (i25,j05), 
(i26,j05), and (i27,j05). The defenders maintain the same tight grouping. 
In the two-defender scenarios the optimal positioning of defensive assets exhibit 
little to no change as the number of attackers increases from two to four attackers. 
Similarly, with the four-defender situations, the positioning of defenders does not change. 
In essence, whether two or four defenders are available, if we anticipate two or more 
attackers, or defensive positioning should remain the same. 
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D. AL BASRA OIL TERMINAL (ABOT) 
 
Figure 28.   Oil tankers taking on fuel at Al Basra Oil Terminal (from: Royal Navy, 
2006). 
The Al Basra Oil Terminal proves the hardest to defend, because it has no 
geographical obstruction between any of the threat entry cells and the goal cells. The goal 
cells on all sides of the terminal mimic the fragile reality of such an offshore structure. 
Even without obstructions between the entry cells and the goal cells, the optimal 
defender-attacker solutions is surprising; we can still optimally position pickets and 
achieve a near 1.0 probability of detection. 
Optimal positioning of two defenders for the ABOT instance is not significantly 
altered whether facing a single attacker or four. Similarly, with four defenders their 
positioning remains relatively the same. However, what proves to be interesting is the 
attacker’s behavior as his number of boats increases. Attackers always enter at the cells 
nearest to the terminal. Against two defenders, the attackers enter from the north first and 
as their numbers increase they enter from both the north and the south. They use the 
target as an obstruction before preceded with a final, direct attack. 
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One attacker i16 j33 i18 j35 
Two attackers i16 j33 i18 j35 
Three attackers i16 j33 i18 j35 
Four attackers i16 j33 i18 j35 
Table 10.   ABOT instance positioning two defender boats against one-to-four attacker 
boats that attack with prior knowledge of defender positioning. 
 
Figure 29.   ABOT instance with a single attacker and two SAFE Defender boats. The 
defended goal cells are all sides of the terminal and marked with “G”. The 
SAFE defender boats are based at cells “K”, both a home and goal cells at 
(i17,j17) and (i17,j19). Obstacle boundaries are shown with “[#]”. The 
attacker can enter via any cell on the threat axis labeled “E”. Defender 
boats cannot locate too close to goal cells, or their alarm would be of little 
use, and “.” indicates possible defender boat locations. The two defenders 
are positioned in cells (i16,j33) and (i18,j35) which forces the single 
attacker to enter at cell (i01,j21) to attack the goal cells via an indirect path 
using the target as an obstruction before turning inbound for a direct final 
attack run. Probability of evasion is near zero. 
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Figure 30.   ABOT instance with three attackers and two SAFE Defender boats. The 
two defenders are positioned in cells (i16,j33) and (i18,j33). The defenders 
do not change their positions from the one-attacker plan. 
 Defender 1 Defender 2 Defender 3 Defender 4 
One attacker i15 j33 i16 j33 i18 j31 i18 j32 
Two attackers i15 j33 i16 j33 i18 j31 i18 j32 
Three attackers i15 j33 i16 j33 i18 j32 i18 j33 
Four attackers i15 j33 i16 j33 i18 j32 i18 j34 
Table 11.   ABOT instance positioning four defender boats against one-to-four attacker 




Figure 31.   ABOT instance with a single attacker and four SAFE Defender boats. The 
four defenders are positioned in cells (i15,j33), (i16,j33), (i18,j31), and 










Figure 32.   ABOT instance with four attackers and four SAFE Defender boats. The 
four defenders are positioned in cells (i15,j33), (i16,j33), (i18,j32), and 





E. U.S. NAVCENT 5TH FLEET – BAHRAIN 
 
Figure 33.   Aerial image of Mina Salman – Bahrain US 5th Fleet Headquarters (from: 
Google Earth). 
Mina Salman’s approaches in Bahrain are very constrained, with only one main 
channel for commercial shipping entering from the south east. However, there are two 
other approaches that small boats can use to enter the port area. In this instance, we allow 
entry cells in both directions to gain insight into the defenders behaviors when faced with 
such a situation. Optimal defenders positions are achievable for all the combinations of 











One attacker i16 j15 i17 j15 
Two attackers i16 j15 i17 j15 
Three attackers i16 j15 i16 j18 
Four attackers i16 j15 i17 j15 
Table 12.   Four attacker boats that attack with prior knowledge of defender positioning. 
 
Figure 34.   Bahrain instance with a single attacker and two SAFE Defender boats. The 
defended goal cells “G” are (i20,j09) and (i21,j08). The SAFE defender 
boats are based at cells “H” at cells (i16,j06) and (i17,j07). Obstacle 
boundaries are shown with “[#]”, and land-mass with “[X]”. The attacker 
can enter via any cell on the threat axis labeled “E” at the northwest and 
southeast corners. Defender boats cannot locate too close to goal cells, or 
their alarm would be of little use, and “.” indicates where they can locate. 
Here, the defenders are located at (i16,j15) and (i17,j15). The lone attacker 
enters at (i01,j11) and, while knowing defender positions, uses the coast to 
maximize probability of evasion to attack goal cell (i20,j09). The attacker 
probability of evasion is near zero. 
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 Defender 1 Defender 2 Defender 3 Defender 4 
One attacker i16 j15 i16 j16 i17 j15 i18 j15 
Two attackers i16 j15 i16 j16 i16 j18 i17 j15 
Three attackers i10 j12 i16 j15 i16 j17 i09 j21 
Four attackers i05 j11 i12 j12 i16 j18 i16 j30 
Table 13.   Bahrain instance – positioning four defender boats against one-to-four 
attacker boats that attack with prior knowledge of defender positioning. 
 
Figure 35.   Bahrain instance with a single attacker and four SAFE Defender boats. 
The defenders are optimally located at (i16,j15), (i16,j16), (i17,j15), and 
(i18, j15). They are tightly grouped and achieve an almost zero probability 









Figure 36.   Bahrain instance with three attackers and four SAFE Defender boats. The 
defenders are located at (i10,j12), (i16,j15), (i16,j17), and (i09,j21). As the 
number of attackers increases to three, we see an interesting optimal 
positioning of defenders. The defenders are more spread out and one 












Figure 37.   Bahrain instance with four attackers and four SAFE Defender boats. The 
defenders are located at (i05,j11), (i12,j12), (i16,j18), and (i16,j30). When 
expecting four attackers the defenders spread out even more to defend 
against both possible threat axes. The first defender locates right under the 
bridge in order to bring the probability of detection to almost 1.0. 
F. GENERIC SURVEILLANCE PLANNING PROBLEM -- POSITIONING A 
SHORE RADAR, PICKET BOATS, AND CONSIDERING ELEVATION 
OF OBSTACLES. 
In our generic instance, we examine the optimal placement of defender boats 
working in conjunction with a shore radar.  We seek to optimally place a shore radar 
given several candidate locations.  We also assign elevation to the shore search radar as 
well as to each obstruction.  Also, we increment boat elevations by the tide level.  This is 
to account for any elevated obstructions, as well as to asses the benefit of elevating a 
sensor over a low-lying one. 
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The behavior observed is very different from our previous instances: the defender 
platforms are optimally placed on the opposite side of the fixed shore radar (see Figure 
38).  Also, the attackers are clearly more concerned with detection by the more powerful 
shore radar than the less capable defender boats. 
 
Figure 38.   Generic instance with four attackers two SAFE Defender boats, and one 
shore based-radar. The defenders are located at (i30,j09) and (i30,j10).  
The shore radar is optimally placed in position (i07, j20).  When expecting 
four attackers the defenders place the shore radar and the defender boats 
on the opposite sides from each other.  The shore radar is placed in the 
north east possible location, while the defender boats are placed in the 
south east.  The attackers choose paths to avoid altogether the side of the 
more powerful shore radar.  In all cases, the probability of detection is 
increased to almost 1.0. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
We introduce a bi-level “defender-attacker” integer linear program to advise 
optimal pre-positioning of defender surveillance pickets to minimize the maximum 
probability that intelligent attackers, observing our surveillance positions, can evade us. 
In every instance we examine, alert defenders with existing radar can detect 
attacker raids with near 100% probability via their optimal pre-positioning. This is due, in 
part, to the restricted navigational access channels to ports: These are bottlenecks that 
offer effective defense postures against attacker speedboats. Still, our optimization 
sometimes suggests surveillance positions far from the bottlenecks, the better to detect 
stealthy, evading attackers. 
In the real world, exceptional conditions such as stormy sea state may complicate 
our planning, and (fortunately) that of our adversary. Suffice to say, if we can evaluate 
the probability that any surveillance platform, in any environmental state, can detect an 
attacking one, we can optimize our pre-positioning as well or better than anyone with less 
knowledge.  
While detection is desirable, early detection is preferable. We can easily weight 
our objective function to move our surveillance forward to press for early detection, 
perhaps at the expense of overall detection. 
Although we are merely planning for a detection and alert, we would prefer to 
also be able to not just contribute to, but to also participate in interdiction. This poses a 
bi-criterion optimization to detect and interdict. While, in theory, we can pose and solve 
such problems, in reality the attacker speeds exceed those of our defenders, complicating 
both the analysis of and the reality of interdiction. We have opted conservatively to 
detect, and alert shore and defended asset point defenses as best we can. We admire the 
combined detect-interdict problem, but leave it to our successors to solve. 
The interested reader can reproduce all of our experiments from the data shown in 
this document. 
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